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Abstract
Cellini and Lambertini [2009. Dynamic R&D with spillovers: Competition vs cooper-
ation. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 33, 568–582] study a dynamic R&D
game with spillovers. This comment demonstrates that, contrary to what is claimed in their
paper, the game is not state redundant and the open-loop Nash equilibrium is not subgame
perfect.
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1 Introduction
Dynamic models are popular in modern industrial organization. They allow to model firms
smoothing their investments over a long time, as well as reacting to each other’s past actions.
Cellini and Lambertini (2009), CL in what follows, presented a continuous-time generalization
of the seminal static R&D model of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988). Their paper compares
R&D incentives of firms that compete on R&D to those that cooperate on R&D. They claim that
in a dynamic model the conflict between individual and social incentives does not necessarily
arise, unlike the situation for the static model.
In particular, their analysis consists of three steps: they characterize the open-loop Nash
equilibrium, they claim to prove that it is subgame perfect, and then they analyze the steady
state allocation. Their proof of subgame perfectness rests on the claim that the closed-loop
equilibrium collapses to the open-loop equilibrium.
The aim of this comment is to show that the second step of their analysis, embodied in
their Lemma 1, is incorrect. First we shall show that the proof of this lemma is flawed, and
subsequently we give a simple argument why the statement of the lemma cannot hold either.
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That is, we show that the open-loop equilibrium is not subgame perfect and the game is not state
redundant or perfect. The solution analyzed in their paper therefore reduces to the open-loop
situation, where firms commit to the entire investment schedule at the beginning of the game.
2 The Model
We quickly summarize the model of CL. Time t ≥ 0 is continuous. There are two firms that
compete in a market with market demand
p(t) = A− q1(t)− q2(t). (1)
Firms decide simultaneously how much to produce (qi) and how much R&D effort to exert (ki).
Instantaneous production costs are Ci(t) = ci(t)qi(t), i = 1, 2, where ci is the marginal cost of
firm i. Marginal costs evolve over time as
c˙i(t) = ci(t)
(−ki(t)− βkj(t) + δ), (2)
where, as always, j 6= i, where 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 is the level of spillover, and where δ ≥ 0 is the
technology depreciation rate. R&D costs (Γi) are quadratic,
Γi(ki) = bk
2
i , (3)
with b > 0, and the instantaneous profit of firm i is therefore
pii(t) =
(
A− qi(t)− qj(t)− ci(t)
)
qi(t)− bki(t)2. (4)
Total discounted profits are
Πi =
∫ ∞
0
pii(t)e
−ρtdt, (5)
where ρ > 0 is a constant discount rate that is equal for both firms. The optimal control problem
of firm i is to find controls q∗i and k
∗
i that maximize the profit functional Πi subject to the state
equations (2) and the initial conditions ci(0) = ci0.
3 The open-loop Nash equilibrium is not subgame perfect
3.1 Subgame perfectness and time consistency
Introduce the notation ui(t) for an open-loop strategy. Recall that an open-loop Nash equilibrium
(u∗1(t), u
∗
2(t)) of this differential game is subgame perfect, or strongly time consistent, if for
every time T > 0, we can change the strategies u∗i (t) for times 0 ≤ t < T at will, as long as the
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resulting strategies are still admissible, and the resulting strategies still provide an open-loop
Nash equilibrium for t ≥ T .
The equilibrium is time consistent, or weakly time consistent, if after having played up to
time T according to the strategies u∗i (t), the players are given the option to reconsider their
strategies for the remainder of the time, and the strategies (u∗1(t), u
∗
2(t)), restricted to t ≥ T , still
form an open-loop Nash equilibrium.
3.2 First argument
CL claim, in their Lemma 1, that the open-loop equilibrium of this game is subgame perfect.
We contest this. Our argument runs as follows: Fershtman (1987) showed that to be
subgame perfect, a Nash equilibrium in open-loop strategies has to be an equilibrium in feedback
strategies; in particular the open-loop equilibrium strategies have to be independent of initial
conditions. For infinite horizon games like the present one, where the only explicit time
dependence is exponential discounting, the set of feedback strategies is necessarily invariant
under time-shifts (Basar and Olsder, 1999). That is, if t 7→ u∗(t) is an equilibrium strategy tuple,
then so is t 7→ u∗(τ + t), for each τ > 0. Moreover, if u∗(t) tends to a limit u∗∞ as t → ∞,
which is the case in the present game, then u(t) = u∗∞ is also an equilibrium feedback strategy
tuple, which is moreover independent of both time and initial conditions; that is, it is a real
constant. This follows from letting τ tend to infinity.
In the present game, this would imply that the state variables are constant — as a consequence
of equation (16) below — and hence that every state is a steady state. However, CL have showed
that under open-loop Nash equilibrium dynamics, there are at most three steady states. This
constitutes a contradiction.
A second, more detailed argument is given in section 3.5.
3.3 First-order optimality conditions
It follows that the proof of Lemma 1 cannot be correct: we shall try to point out its flaws.
CL use the memoryless closed-loop information structure (cf. Basar and Olsder, 1999): a
strategy is memoryless closed-loop, if it conditions the action of the player on the current state
and time, as well as on the initial state. That is, in the present game a closed-loop strategy u∗i of
player i is of the form
u∗i =
(
q∗i (t, c10, c20, c1(t), c2(t)), k
∗
i (t, c10, c20, c1(t), c2(t))
)
,
where ci0 = ci(0) for i = 1, 2.
The necessary optimality conditions for firm i can be derived from the Maximum Principle,
assuming that player j has announced a closed-loop strategy u∗j(t, c10, c20, c1(t), c2(t)). Denoting
the costates that firm i associates with the states ci and cj as λii and λij , the current-value
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Hamiltonian of firm i is
Hi(λii, λij, ci, cj, qi, q
∗
j , ki, k
∗
j ) = (A− qi − q∗j − ci)qi − bk2i
− λiici(ki + βk∗j − δ)− λijcj(k∗j + βki − δ).
(6)
Here we use the convention that arguments t are suppressed, as in ci = ci(t), and that the
arguments of the closed-loop strategy functions like q∗i (t, c10, c20, c1, c2) are suppressed as well.
The non-starred variables qi and ki indicate mere variables.
If the maximum is obtained for an interior solution, the first-order conditions with respect to
the controls qi and ki are
∂Hi
∂qi
= A− 2qi − q∗j (c1, c2)− ci = 0 ⇔ q∗i =
A− q∗j − ci
2
, (7)
∂Hi
∂ki
= −2bki − λiici − βλijcj = 0 ⇔ k∗i = −
λiici + βλijcj
2b
. (8)
The first costate equation reads
λ˙ii = ρλii − ∂Hi
∂ci
− ∂Hi
∂qi
∂q∗i
∂ci
− ∂Hi
∂q∗j
∂q∗j
∂ci
− ∂Hi
∂ki
∂k∗i
∂ci
− ∂Hi
∂k∗j
∂k∗j
∂ci
(9)
= ρλii − ∂Hi
∂ci
− ∂Hi
∂q∗j
∂q∗j
∂ci
− ∂Hi
∂k∗j
∂k∗j
∂ci
. (10)
The third and fifth term on the RHS in (9) are enveloped out using the first-order conditions
(7)–(8). Evaluating the derivatives, we obtain
λ˙ii = q
∗
i + λii(k
∗
i + βk
∗
j + ρ− δ) + q∗i
∂q∗j
∂ci
+ (βλiici + λijcj)
∂k∗j
∂ci
. (11)
The second costate equation reads
λ˙ij = ρλij − ∂Hi
∂cj
− ∂Hi
∂qi
∂q∗i
∂cj
− ∂Hi
∂q∗j
∂q∗j
∂cj
− ∂Hi
∂ki
∂k∗i
∂cj
− ∂Hi
∂k∗j
∂k∗j
∂cj
(12)
= ρλij − ∂Hi
∂cj
− ∂Hi
∂q∗j
∂q∗j
∂cj
− ∂Hi
∂k∗j
∂k∗j
∂cj
. (13)
The third and fifth term on RHS in (12) have again been enveloped out using the first-order
conditions (7)–(8). Evaluating the derivatives, we obtain
λ˙ij = λij
(
k∗j + βk
∗
i + ρ− δ + cj
∂k∗j
∂cj
)
+ βλiici
∂k∗j
∂cj
+ q∗i
∂q∗j
∂cj
. (14)
In a closed-loop Nash equilibrium, the conditions (7), (8), (11) and (14) need to hold for both
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firms, together with the state equations (2), the initial conditions ci(0) = ci0 and transversality
conditions as t→∞.
Note that the equations (7) for the quantities q∗i do not involve any costates; in a Nash
equilibrium in either closed-loop or feedback strategies, they form the system
q∗i =
A− q∗j − ci
2
, q∗j =
A− q∗i − cj
2
, (15)
which can be solved to obtain the optimal controls q∗i as functions of the states
q∗1(t, c10, c20, c1, c2) =
A− 2c1 + c2
3
, q∗2(t, c10, c20, c1, c2) =
A− 2c2 + c1
3
. (16)
From this we obtain in particular that ∂q∗j/∂cj = −2/3.
3.4 Cross-multipliers cannot always vanish
We can now examine the claim of CL that there is always a possible solution in this model for
which the cross-multipliers λij vanish identically for all t. Setting β = 0 and assuming that
λij(t) = 0 for all t, equation (14) implies that
0 = −2
3
q∗i (17)
for all t, implying that there is never any production. But in the steady state given by CL, q∗i > 0;
this is a contradiction.
The incorrect conclusion is caused by two mistakes made in the derivation of Lemma 1,
which is contained in Appendix A of CL. First, it is stated incorrectly that “Observe that (9)
only contains firm i’s state variable, so that in choosing the optimal output at any time during
the game firm i may disregard the current efficiency of the rival” (CL, Appendix A). Their
equation (9) is equivalent to our equation (7). This error possibly resulted from not writing out
the argument of q∗j .
Second, in the derivation of the all-important equation (14), that is equation (A.2) in CL, it is
claimed that this equation is equal to the following equation, which is written in our notation as
λ˙ij = ρλij − ∂Hi
∂cj
− ∂Hi
∂ki
∂k∗i
∂cj
. (18)
Note the differences with our equation (14): the terms involving ∂q∗j/∂cj and ∂k
∗
j/∂cj are
missing, while a term involving ∂Hi/∂ki is present. But for an interior solution, this latter term
vanishes because of the Maximum Principle.
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3.5 Second argument
Here we give a more detailed argument, not relying on Fershtman (1987), showing that the claim
of Lemma 1 of CL cannot hold.
In CL it has been shown that the game under open-loop strategies has at most three possible
symmetric steady states, of which one is of a saddle type. Take initial cost levels (c1(0), c2(0)) =
(c0, c0), not equal to a steady state value, and such that under the associated open-loop Nash
equilibrium strategies (u∗1(t), u
∗
2(t)) the system tends to the symmetric steady state of a saddle
type. Arguing by contradiction, let us assume that the open-loop Nash equilibrium is strongly
time consistent.
Recall that in order to be subgame perfect, for any T > 0 the restriction of the u∗i (t) to t ≥ T
should yield an open-loop Nash equilibrium for the trajectory starting at time T from the state
ci(T ).
We introduce the modified controls
k˜i(t) =
 δ1+β for 0 ≤ t ≤ T,k∗i (t) for t > T,
q˜i(t) = q
∗
i (t),
for i = 1, 2. It follows that the modified state evolutions satisfy ˙˜ci(t) = 0 for 0 ≤ t ≤ T :
that is, c˜i(t) is constant on this time interval and c˜i(T ) = c˜i(0) = c0. The proof rests on the
observation that the controls u∗i (t), and hence also the modified controls u˜i(t), tend exponentially
to their steady-state values as t → ∞; by subgame perfectness, the u˜i(t) form an open-loop
Nash equilibrium for the system starting at the c˜i(T ); hence the c˜i(t) have to tend to one of
the possible three steady-state values. On the other hand, ˙˜ci(t) = 0 for 0 ≤ t ≤ T and ˙˜ci(t)
is almost 0 for t > T : this limits the maximal distance between the initial values c0 and the
limiting values of c˜i(t) as t→∞, leading to a contradiction.
In order to execute the details, note that since the state trajectory tends to the steady state,
we have
lim
t→∞
k∗i (t) = lim
t→∞
k˜i(t) =
δ
1 + β
.
We introduce ∆i(t) by
k˜i(t) =
δ
1 + β
+ ∆i(t).
From the theory of differential equations, we can find C > 0, λ ∈ R, such that
|∆i(t)| ≤ Ce−λt.
Such an inequality holds clearly for large t and λ close to the largest negative real part of an
eigenvalue of the saddle steady state; by taking C sufficiently large, it can be made to hold for
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all t ≥ 0.
Substituting these expressions in the state dynamics (2) yields
d
dt
log c˜i(t) =
˙˜ci
c˜i
= δ − ki(t)− βkj(t) = −∆i(t)− β∆j(t).
From this relation, we derive the estimate
| log c˜i(t)− log c˜i(0)| = | log c˜i(t)− log c˜i(T )| ≤
∫ t
T
|−∆i − β∆j| ds ≤
∫ t
T
(1 + β)Ce−λsds
≤ 2Ce−λT . (19)
Take ε > 0 sufficiently small such that the steady state (c¯, c¯) of the differential game does not
satisfy e−εc0 ≤ c¯ ≤ eεc0; for the rest is ε arbitrary. We now choose T such that 2Ce−λT = ε.
Then it follows from (19) that
e−εc0 ≤ c˜i(t) ≤ eεc0
for all t, and hence that c˜i(t) tends to a steady-state value in this interval. As ε > 0 was arbitrary,
it follows that (c0, c0) is a limit point of steady states, and therefore a steady state itself. But
(c0, c0) has been chosen such that it is not a steady state; hence we have reached a contradiction,
and the open-loop Nash equilibrium cannot be subgame perfect.
This shows again that the claim of Lemma 1 is not correct.
4 Concluding remarks
Contrary to what is claimed in CL, the closed-loop solution of the R&D game does not coincide
with the open-loop solution. Consequently, the game under consideration is not state-redundant
or perfect, and the paper effectively discusses only the open-loop solution.
Some of the main conclusions in CL relate to the private and social desirability of R&D
cooperation. This analysis depends on the present value of variables that are affected by the R&D
investments of firms over time. As the closed-loop solution differs from the open-loop solution,
it is open to question to what an extent (if at all) are conclusions in CL relevant to great many
industries in which firms do not commit to the entire investment schedules at the very beginning
but can later strategically alter them at will in response to competitors. It is also open to question
how realistic the formulation of R&D cartel in CL is. In their derivations for the R&D Cartel
(pp. 573–574 in CL), CL implicitly assume that if marginal cost within the R&D cooperative
changes, the opponent’s quantity does not change. Besides clearly violating the feedback
principle underlying the closed-loop solution, this imposition also appears counterintuitive as
firms in the R&D cooperative are (usually) supposed to jointly decide on their R&D efforts
taking into account that marginal cost in any period affects the ensuing Nash-equilibrium profits
in the product market. These specific modelling choices in CL are important to bear in mind
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also when one potentially considers comparing other possible regimes (i.e., market collusion) to
regimes considered in CL. Conclusions in other papers that use the same analytical approach
(e.g., Cellini and Lambertini, 2005; Cellini and Lambertini, 2011) should also be reexamined in
a similar way.
Acknowledgements
We are grateful to the editor, Herbert Dawid, and two anonymous referees for insightful com-
ments and suggestions.
References
[1] Basar, T., Olsder G.J., 1999. Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory, second ed. SIAM,
New York.
[2] Cellini, R., Lambertini, L., 2005. R&D incentives and market structure: dynamic analysis.
Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications 126, 85–96.
[3] Cellini, R., Lambertini, L., 2009. Dynamic R&D with spillovers: Competition vs coopera-
tion. Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 33, 568–582.
[4] Cellini, R., Lambertini, L., 2011. R&D incentives under Bertrand Competition: A differen-
tial game. Japanese Economic Review 62, 387–400.
[5] d’Aspremont, C., Jacquemin, A., 1988. Cooperative and noncooperative R&D in duopoly
with spillovers. The American Economic Review 78, 1133–1137.
[6] Fershtman, C., 1987. Identification of Classes of Differential Games for Which the Open
Loop Is a Degenerate Feedback Nash Equilibrium. Journal of Optimization Theory and
Applications 55, 217–231.
8
